EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION: MODES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
CRAIG SCHAMEL

When the theme for this issue of Catalyst was conceived, it was imagined that contributions might
present both defenses and critiques of liberal justice, that is, one might say, that these contributions would
either promote reformist or revolutionary modes of justice. Instead, all of the submissions took a fairly
decisive position of critique of liberal modes of justice, though they are not necessarily in agreement
about what constitutes a revolutionary mode of social justice, and they do not always adopt the term
'revolution' itself as a description of the critique they present and the direction in which they point.
Not only did the spirit and letter of the submissions for this issue effectively endorse revolutionary
modes of social justice, but these works hit the ground running, with most immediately moving into
attempts to describe and help create a strategy of practice for a social justice which could be called
revolutionary, and which rather decisively rejects liberalism and in some fundamental ways, conveying in
spirit a sense of impatience even with justice as it is conceived and carried out by liberal systems. It is
this spirit of the authors of these works and the feeling of eagerness to describe and participate in the
effectuation of a revolutionary praxis which they convey, and also on the idea of liberalism as an
ideology, on which I focus briefly in this introduction.
When we implicate 'liberalism' by placing it in the position of ideologies, discourses, and apparatuses
of injustice, we use a term which is "a vague term that embraces many diverse and even incompatible
positions."1 Nevertheless, critics of liberalism as a mode of social justice and strategists of social justice
are increasingly aware that even an uncongealed or derivative historical demarcation can still very much
be considered the primary locus of injustice, and a valuable framework or ideology for the comprehension
of questions of justice as they are playing out in practice, as well as a framework for the development of
strategies for the achievement of social justice, even if "liberal theorists attempt to justify an arrogation of
liberalism to a political-philosophical position that is superideological."2
A critique of the liberal mode of justice with a focus on strategy, which is in keeping with the
directive of Catalyst to focus on the practice as well as the theory of social justice, and to "push the ideals
of social justice to new levels" gives rise in turn to theory, and also makes use of, is nourished by, and
improves upon existing theories. Theories that can be understood to speak to the practice of social justice
often become the contextual framework within which the practice of social justice occurs. Or is it the
reverse? One must suppose that it is both, actually - that, generally speaking, practice and theory are
mutually informative and create one another, albeit in different sorts and types of relationships. That said,
with the questions that this issue of Catalyst raises, we can perhaps be permitted to wonder if we are
approaching a change in the way that theory is done by scholars and academicians, a change that is not a
movement toward theory in the service of the needs of "employers" and capital and markets, but rather
one that moves toward practice in a very different way, akin to the way that medicine first detached itself
from philosophy as a practical τέχνη.3
One of the larger questions that serves as a foundation for this interaction of theory and practice is the
question of whether social justice can best be achieved primarily locally or primarily at some larger level,
such as the national or global level. The presentation of local solutions to the problems of social justice is
evidenced in the work of Russi and Ferrando, who put forward the food sovereignty movement, which
contains within it a critique of large scale plans for food production and distribution, as a potential
solution to those problems of production and distribution. Russi and Ferrando wisely use some of the
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same analytic tools and mechanisms of evidence and proof that advocates of globalized, state-organized,
and market ruled systems use, in order to show that these systems can be irrational and inefficient. The
food sovereignty movement and other movements that promote a more localized control and an autonomy
that does not seem possible without such localization are really rejecting the larger apparatuses of the
administration of life and justice traditionally promoted by both advocates of state-planned economies
and by market ideologues. Put in terms of liberalism, the tying of local control to greater social justice
can imply the distrust of totalizing critiques and remedies of justice, and this is understandable in an era
when communist states, while achieving great levels of economic justice, failed to adequately address the
social aspects of justice, and when the state apparatus in liberal states has become little more than an
footservant of finance capital. Further, as the work of Yaghi elucidates, the false universality of the tenets
and practices of social justice in the liberal polity, and the racist and nationalist distortions and exclusions
that are part of the liberal society's actual discourse and practice of justice seem to force those who might
otherwise look to more universal ideas of justice to regroup and to practice the politics of forced
localization, i.e. an identity politics that is forced to be responsive to the racist or nationalistic delusions
of the liberal polity. Yaghi quotes Charles Taylor, who writes that identity in liberal societies is often
shaped by the misrecognition of others. Taylor, though, who is among those engaged in the redemption
and reform of the liberal state and in its practical mainstay, social-democratic politics, will not likely go
where Yaghi takes his thesis, and that is to the advocacy of revolution on the very basis of such
"misrecogniton" and what it produces. There is then, an important sense in which a kind of localization is
forced on political and social actors by the liberal state and its false universal and democratic idea of
justice, and in this forced localization and parochialization can lie incipient revolution.
Political strategy and strategy for social justice for theoreticians has for many years now in
Western thought been bound up with the understanding of power as micropower, in which power is
understood as occurring often outside the state, and in the dynamics of a relational subjectivity, with the
expression of justice often, within this understanding, taking the form of expressions of justice and power
in the interstices of a culture in which loci of power are continually shifting, being recreated, rechanneled,
understood. The problematization of this understanding of power, which attempts to render former
conceptualizations of power obsolete, is evident in the papers of both Sharif and Ishcenko, with Sharif
offering a pointed and sophisticated critique of its shortcomings, which have to do with the fact that "all
forms of micropolitics recommend resistance in bits and pieces [and]...fetishize the everyday struggle
against the control of power" and Ishchenko designing social science research which helps to illuminate
specific problems in the confrontation of state, systemic, and historical power by groups which attempt to
evade or confound these systemic problems and injustices with the type of spontaneity and immediacy of
the social group format, groups whose self-conception seems to comport with the micropowermicropolitics understanding of power. This problematization of theories and practices of micropower in
terms of resistance is, I believe, important to the understanding of how to achieve social justice insofar as
the achievement of such involves confrontation of liberal-systemic processes and powers. Anyone who
has some knowledge of the operation of political groups who are highly concerned with justice will know
this problem. While we who are concerned with social justice have rightly paid obeisance and respect to
a reconceptualization of the power with which social justice has had to be concerned, what are we to
make of the fact that, in practical experience for example, anarchists, while claiming a greater level of
fairness and focusing on internal or prefigurative justice, in my direct experience, have taken over and
commanded other organizations thereby, quashing dissent with, for example, rules for internal procedure
which allow for tyranny and the silencing of many voices? And, at the superorganizational political level,
can we still agree, after the fuller unfolding of neoconservative politics, with Deleuze and Guattari when
they write that "the masses are not tricked by ideological lures into submitting to power"?4
The understanding of micropolitics through micropower, as a framework within which social
justice is studied and pursued, is not only a positive understanding which can concern itself with the
development of strategies for social justice, but it can also be, and is in its more original Foucauldian
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conception, a phenomenon which acts against social justice, as Russi and Ferrando point up when they
"[try] to sketch a picture of the effort aimed at rearranging farming according to the calculative logic of
capital" which occurs via "carving spaces of control (assets) on which an investment calculus can
subsequently be pegged." More often though, a localized understanding of power, which modulates
traditional and micropolitical conceptions of agency, is seen as the best position from which to create
resistance to social injustice, as in the participatory approaches to research described by Sitter and Burke,
who show consciousness of this localization of power to effectuate social justice: "Change in this context
is not necessarily characterized by large-scale alterations to policies and systems", but who incorporate,
among other approaches, a Freirian sociopolitical model which, while "stressing community-led learning
and praxis" incorporates an awareness and conscious addressing of the problem and reality of larger and
systemic power, that power which has the ability to create systematic education. Freire asks, "But if the
implementation of a liberating education requires political power and the oppressed have none, how then
is it possible to carry out the pedagogy of the oppressed prior to the revolution?" 5
The papers in this themed issue of Catalyst also bring up the question of the position of the social in
relation to the political, and of its structure, and its connectedness to justice. The question of this
distinction and relationship is partly a question of whether individuals or political or social groups are
better vehicles for the achievement of social justice, and under what circumstances. The question of what
the social is in relation to the political often plays itself out in the effective or express answers to such
questions. Sitter and Burke describe strategies for social justice within groups that primarily see
themselves as social, and as operating in the mode of a social movement, and Sharif points the way
toward spatiotemporal templates for the comprehension of justice which he finds superior to infrapolitics:
"spatial entitlement has much more potential for organizing a social movement". It is the political that is
often seen as the locus of the oppressive, and the social as the place where both the pain of political
injustice is felt and lived (e.g. in the exclusion and 'othering' of French Muslims [Yaghi]), and also the
place where resistance often begins or seems most correct or genuine, despite the existence of welldeveloped economic and political theories and patterns and avenues to justice. Even though the social is
the realm where the pain of injustice is often felt the most, my own essay points up the problem of too
much strategic reliance on the social when the political, sometimes in the form of the propaganda which
creates and shapes discourses, overpowers this social realm.
Insofar as the social realm is comprised, in terms of the practice of social justice, of social
movements, we must be aware that "the reality is that, whatever their transformative potential, new social
movements have shown a marked incapacity for confronting the imperatives of political power."6Thus,
while the social is on the rise in terms of its centrality to human identity,7 we as theoreticians of the social
cannot slip into delusionality about its current power in relation to the political, a problem illustrated by
the 'discourse of hate' propounded by the liberal establishment as a template for the comprehension of
anti-gay abuse. Such problems are compounded by the fact that, the more that one accedes to the false
discourses of political power, the more power one has to describe the social. These false discourses can
have an express layer, such as the liberal constitutional tenet of "freedom of speech" problematized in the
work of Yaghi, or less express but equally deleterious assumptions, such as the "ableism" pointed to by
Sitter and Burke, which underlies rights discourses and constitutes social movement assumptions.
Important questions about the relationship between the social and the political are raised around this
question of ableism in their description of the citizenship components of the disability rights movement
(D.R.M.), questions such as that of how "social policy" is created by political powers, while in
Ishchenko's work, the "value-rational solution" approach to systemic injustice illustrates some of the
problems of attempts to effect systemic change from a position that is more that of a social group than a
traditional political one.
In the practical mode of social justice, one of the concerns to emerge from these works is what would
seem to be a central question for those concerned with social justice, and that is the question of against
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whom or against what we are struggling when we struggle for social justice. The answer is, in the main,
that it is the liberal political establishment against which we struggle, either in its (performative) entirety
(Yaghi) or in its specific elements at the state and international level (Russi and Ferrando). Often though,
an accusatory finger is expressly or effectively pointed toward academia itself as an aspect of this liberal
state (Sitter and Burke, Sharif, Schamel) or toward specific disciplines within academia, such as social
movement studies (Ishchenko). That is, insofar as most of the contributors to and readers of Catalyst are,
if not full time academicians, persons who have at least dalliances therewith, that accusatory and
impatient finger is pointed in some sense toward ourselves.
Various aspects of the liberal polity, and of globalism (transnational liberalism) are often seen by
critics in terms of ideology. Louis Althusser, in his theory of ideology,8 names the educational system of
the liberal state as the most important of what he calls 'ideological state apparatuses'; that is, as an
apparatus which, despite its pretensions to criticality and independence, exists primarily to serve the
interests of a state-supported system of injustice, and is actually the primary functionary of those interests.
Even if, however, academia and the entire education system can and should be considered the primary
manifestation of a system of injustice which we might call 'liberal ideology', it is not the only one. Sitter
and Burke address the mass media's legitimization and normalization of political ideologies, using the
term 'ideology' in an only slightly more limited sense, while, with the same sense of ideology in mind, my
own essay points up the problems of religious ideology, and the way it becomes part of (and always was
part of ) the idiom of liberal politics. Sharif rightly questions the very question of revolution in its
contradistinction to reformism, pointing up in so doing the fact that often critical discourses themselves
can be misbegotten insofar as they incorporate elements of a hegemonic 'ideology' At the convergence of
ideology and strategy, Ishchenko's thesis undertakes, as one of its elements, an examination of
prefigurative politics as an ideology of praxis.
Several years ago, before I began boycotting American Political Science Association meetings, at
one of these meetings I had the pleasure of taking a short walk with Anne Norton, who had written book
on the Straussian political philosophers, who were among those with whom both she and I had studied,
and somehow emerged as something more like progressive and revolutionary, respectively, against the
natural right conservatism of some of our teachers. Our conversation brought up love and its position in
scholarship and the idea of it as a motivation. We both became uncomfortable, or at least, I did. Mention
the word 'love' in connection with your research and you will witness an evident unease on the part of
scholars, and even perhaps some signs of disapproval. Likewise with anger. I remember when, at the
founding of one revolutionary organization, a woman announced, "We found this organization in love and
anger." Putting the two together struck me as the motivation for revolution. More precisely, it was the
idea that, without anger when it was appropriate, there was no love. But we tend to, with good reason,
consider the disinterestedness of social science one of the pillars of its value, even if we are inclined to
think that doing social science might require a different approach from that of other sciences. Somehow
though, a concern with social justice seems to require a different relationship between emotion and
scholarship.
Relatedly, we can ask whether working toward social justice even makes sense in a period during
which the old political-philosophical problems of identity and free will are dominated in discourses of the
social by 'subjectivity' and 'sites of agency' - that is, whether the relevant repository of love and anger and
other feelings is still personal identity. In the pursuit of social justice, we can ask if there is such a thing
as an enemy, or as a 'that against which we fight'. For social scientists, the concept of an enemy is
problematic. And yet, the past forty years in the U.S. and in the Western World have seen the
shortcomings of social scientific practice when faced with such forces as globalism and neoconservatism.
And how do we fight for social justice if causation no longer finds a home in the traditional view of
individual actors as forces who can be considered responsible for deleterious actions? Can a stand still
then be taken in the premises of social science questions, as I believe Russi and Ferrando and Ishchenko
so valuably attempt to do? In the prioritization and formulation of research agendas? In the naming of
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problems? Is not objectivity a part of the procedure of science, after one has a hypothesis? And does not
the problem always occur at the point of formulation of the hypothesis, that is, in that under-region -ϓπό'of the scientific process?
Are we permitted to be angry, and to incorporate that anger into our theory
and action? And, perhaps more importantly, if our work, if our research, and if we as scholars who stand
on this work are to endorse revolution, are we really willing to back that endorsement up with effective
action, or is it the case with us that, as Robespierre said, we "want revolution without a revolution" revolution with no harm, suffering, or punition; or, as Slavoj Zizek formulates it, "revolution deprived of
the excess in which democracy and terror coincide?9
Or are we merely slipping into a sentimentality that is unproductive of actual social justice when we
raise these questions?
... I am now thinking of Eve K. Sedgwick's call to redeem sentimentality.10 I am thinking of the Greek
people's attempts to fight back as they are clubbed to death by the bankers and their footservants. Of the
image of the chador, maliciously overlain with the idea of evil. Of the gay-iconic image of Marsha P.
Johnson's dead body floating in the Hudson River.......
To the extent that, when we indict liberalism and reformism from the perspective of social justice,
it is we as social scientists and scholars who are the indicted, perhaps any evidence we might find of our
willingness to traffic in these kinds of thoughts and to let them motivate and even change the nature of
our scholarship, is one thing we can call to our defense.
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